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As is known, in Italy some vaccinations are mandatory and some
others are recommended. But always more frequently there are par-
ents who, when asked their children participate to the vaccination
campaign, answer with: Sorry, we have decided not to vaccinate our
child, we have the right to choose.
It is not here the right place to investigate the reasons (if any)
under this choice, but to understand whether there is a right to the
individual’s choice or a right to the state’s coercion and whether the
state could be legitimized to be coercive and by whom.
In order to set correctly the matter, it is worth recalling that the con-
temporary father of the theory of liberty, that is, John Stuart Mill, in
the introduction of his 1859 masterpiece, famously claimed that The
liberty of the individual must be […] limited: he must not make him-
self a nuisance to other people. This statement is better clarified from
the following two apparently contradictory sentences: […] the only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member
of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant, and
[…] in the part, which merely concerns himself, his independence is,
of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the indi-
vidual is sovereign.1 That is, one is free to decide everything about his
life provided that his actions do not to harm others (it is the harm prin-
ciple) even though there are cases in which a state can infringe such
a right if the common good is in danger.
Thus, on the one hand there is the individual who can claim that he
is free not to vaccinate his child since over his child’s body he is the
only one who can decide what to do. But on the other hand there is the
state that can claim that it has the duty/right to mandatorily vaccinate
that child since that action could avoid jeopardizing the heath of other
children (but also the health of that child) and thus create a collective
danger. 
Up to now, the state behaviour had been based on a strong form of
paternalism (the intentional overriding of one individual’s known
preferences or actions by the state, on the basis of the idea that it
knows better what individuals should do in order to avoid harm to
themselves and to the collectivity, and thus it arrogates to itself the
right to override individual deviant choices). Unfortunately, paternal-
ism, in particular state paternalism, is considered unacceptable, espe-
cially whenever it is related to health choices: Why should I accept
state paternalism concerning vaccination? Who legitimized it to act in
such a way? And why?
These are the questions at issue. And a right answer might allow a
different way of conveying the benefits of a vaccination campaign.
Concerning this point we should not forget that citizens are now more
(mis)informed than in the past decades and that now they are more
willing to be free to decide their own lifestyles without any real or
apparent coercion by the state.
Thus, how to do with the gap between the right of the individuals to
ask to be free and not to accept state paternalism and the duty/right of
the state to protect all the individuals? Probably a good way out, which
might help in rethinking the vaccination campaigns, could come from
libertarian paternalism and from deliberation.
Libertarian paternalism is a decisional approach based on the
assumptions that: i) it is false that individuals always (or usually)
make choices that are in their best interest; ii) in many situations,
some authority (i.e. the state) must make a (more or less) mandatory
policy that will affect individuals’ choices and life styles; iii) not always
paternalism involves coercion. Thus, according to libertarian paternal-
ism, an authority should introduce positive rules related to proper
lifestyles or health choices. Of course, these positive rules should be
limited to decisions that are difficult, complex and infrequent, and
when individuals have poor feedbacks and few opportunities for know-
ing and learning. In such cases an authority (the state) has the
duty/right to intervene.2-4
Such libertarian paternalism is a variant of the so-called weak pater-
nalism (an authority intervenes on ground of beneficence or non-
maleficence only to prevent substantially bad consequences of actions
made by individuals without a proper capacity of analysis, without ade-
quate knowledge or information, or under irrational or false motiva-
tions). This means that the authority should not brutally force individ-
uals to act in the way it thinks to be the best one, but it should study
and provide nudges to encourage individuals to act in a certain way.
Said differently, such an authority should be a sort of choice architect
who designs apt decisional scenarios, where nudges have a preemi-
nent role, so that individuals choose better.5
The libertarian paternalism approach is having a great success,
especially in the USA, and it has been the conceptual basis for many
institutional campaigns regarding correct lifestyles and the implemen-
tation of health policies. For example, concerning tobacco, it has been
proposed to sell it only to adults who have purchased an annual per-
sonal permit (this is the nudge); concerning salt in food, it has been
proposed to produce unsalted foods (this is the nudge) so that con-
sumers must deliberately add salt if they wish; concerning correct
nutrition, it has been proposed an agreement with supermarkets for
the prominent display of healthy foods and visible warnings for those
that are potentially harmful, free distribution of fresh fruit in primary
schools and the involvement of firms in similar schemes for their
employees (these are the nudges).
This idea could be also at the basis of new vaccination campaigns
according to which an authority (the state) studies and designs a cor-
rect apt scenario with the right nudges so that individuals are gently
induced to act positively regards both mandatory and recommended
vaccinations.Yet, at this point a problem arises: even if it is a weak
form of paternalism, libertarian paternalism is always a sort of state
paternalism and who has legitimized the state to act in such a way and
why? If we were not able to give a plausible solution to this problem,
we would be in the same situation as before: the state tells us (more
or less gently) what we should do and this could not be accepted by
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individuals thinking that their will comes first.
At this point deliberation enters the scene. By deliberation is meant
any system of political (or ethical) decision based on some tradeoff of
consensus decision-making and representative democracy. In contrast
to the traditional theory of democracy, which emphasizes voting as the
central institution, deliberative democracy theorists argue that legiti-
mate policies can only arise from the public deliberation of the citizen-
ry. Very briefly, deliberation is the procedure through which people,
starting from different initial positions, try to reach a shared decision
via a debate based on rational arguments and counter-arguments.6-8
This deliberative approach has been used many times in the field of
political and ethical public decisions concerning health and biomedical
research policies. For example, it was used by the Health Services
Commission of Oregon to involve citizens to decide which health plan
should be adopted,9 or by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Authority of UK to decide whether the research on cybrids (cytoplasmic
hybrids) was ethically plausible,10 and in many other cases.11-15
Summing up, by means of a deliberative process citizens, who have
been previously properly informed about the science (medicine) in
play and about its ethical and social implications, can propose their
view about heath policies and in this manner they legitimate the state
to act consequently. In such a way, a strong state paternalism is over-
come and the citizens concede to the state the right to act for the ben-
efit of many and, thus, to be weak paternalist and to propose nudges to
efficaciously implement the health policies, that have been deliberat-
ed. Note, and this is the central point of the question, one thing is a top-
down approach to health policies: the state decides to be (strong or
weak) paternalist and mandatorily forces the citizens to adopt a cer-
tain health policy (e.g. vaccination). Yet a totally different thing is a
bottom-up approach that legitimates the top-down: the citizens delib-
eratively decide to lose a small percentage of their autonomy and to
give to the state the permission to be weak paternalist since they
accept that in certain cases (e.g. vaccination) the state can do better. 
If what above sounds, all the vaccination campaigns so far imple-
mented in Italy have been based on a wrong assumption: the state
knows better and the citizens have to obey. But on the basis of a liber-
tarian paternalistic approach inside a deliberative context, we could
and should rethink the vaccination campaigns so that the citizens,
once scientifically, ethically and sociologically informed, have the
chance to decide to attribute to the state the task to provide nudges for
properly implementing scientifically correct vaccination policies for
the benefits of the entire population. Of course, this is an ethically
praiseworthy result but even an extremely good public health strategy.
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